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dc.contributor.authorDonald Lien
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-25T06:09:30Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-25T06:09:30Z-
dc.date.issued2002/12/01
dc.identifier.issnissn16070704
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.fcu.edu.tw/handle/2376/2189-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers a nonprofit firm competing against a for-profit firm in a homogenous goods market. Given a stochastic demand function and an asymmetric tax schedule, we derive Cournot-Nash equilibrium allowing the nonprofit firm to have an altruistic preference toward consumer surplus or total surplus. The effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes are analyzed thereof.
dc.description.sponsorship逢甲大學
dc.format.extent15
dc.language.iso英文
dc.relation.ispartofseriesinternational journal of business and economics
dc.relation.isversionofVolume1No3
dc.subjectnonprofit|asymmetric taxation|stochastic demand|Cournot-Nash equilibrium
dc.titleCompetition between Nonprofit and For-Profit Firms
dc.type期刊篇目
分類:Volume01,No.3

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