| 題名: | Risk Signaling in the Health Insurance Market |
| 作者: | Chu-Shiu Li |
| 關鍵字: | adverse selection|separating equilibrium|pooling equilibrium|signaling costs |
| 期刊名/會議名稱: | international journal of business and economics |
| 摘要: | This paper analyzes equilibrium health insurance premium dependencies on signaling costs given individual health states, risk types, and risk type attributes. Since precise determination of an individual’s premium is costly, insurers can categorize insureds based on relative screening costs. We show for two risk types, the equilibrium premium is either community-rated or risk-rated depending on screening costs. For multiple risk types, both policies may be concurrently available in equilibrium. |
| ISSN: | issn16070704 |
| 日期: | 2005/04/01 |
| 分類: | Volume04,No.1 |
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