完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Spiros Bougheas | |
| dc.contributor.author | Saksit Thananittayaudom | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-25T06:29:13Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-25T06:29:13Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2006/12/01 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | issn16070704 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.fcu.edu.tw/handle/2376/2267 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider a Stackelberg game, where a financially constrained leader competes with_x000D_ a “deep pocket” follower, and analyze the trade-off between a financial and a strategic_x000D_ advantage for both the design of financial contracts and market structure. | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | 逢甲大學 | |
| dc.format.extent | 14 | |
| dc.language.iso | 英文 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | international journal of business and economics | |
| dc.relation.isversionof | Volume5,No.3 | |
| dc.subject | predation|financial contracts|Stackelberg game | |
| dc.title | Financial Predation by the “Weak” | |
| dc.type | 期刊篇目 | |
| 分類: | Volume05,No.3 | |
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