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dc.contributor.authorLuigi Filippini
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-25T06:29:13Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-25T06:29:13Z-
dc.date.issued2006/12/01
dc.identifier.issnissn16070704
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.fcu.edu.tw/handle/2376/2269-
dc.description.abstractIn a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process_x000D_ innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm_x000D_ produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve._x000D_ Patent pool extension confirms the results.
dc.description.sponsorship逢甲大學
dc.format.extent10
dc.language.iso英文
dc.relation.ispartofseriesinternational journal of business and economics
dc.relation.isversionofVolume5,No.3
dc.subjectcross-licensing|patent pool|specialization|process innovation
dc.titleCournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing
dc.type期刊篇目
分類:Volume05,No.3

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