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dc.contributor.authorRanadeb Chaudhuri
dc.contributor.authorHoontaek Seo
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-25T06:38:03Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-25T06:38:03Z-
dc.date.issued2010/04/01
dc.identifier.issnissn16070704
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.fcu.edu.tw/handle/2376/2316-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the effect of classified boards on the market reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements and the operating performance following SEOs. We find that firms with classified boards on average earn lower SEO announcement returns and have worse abnormal operating performance following SEOs relative to firms with unitary boards. Our results support the view that classified boards entrench managers and are ineffective in preventing them from misusing funds raised in SEOs.
dc.description.sponsorship逢甲大學
dc.format.extent15
dc.language.iso英文
dc.relation.ispartofseriesinternational journal of business and economics
dc.relation.isversionofVolume9,No.1
dc.subjectclassified boards|secondary equity offering|managerial entrenchment
dc.titleClassified Boards and Managerial Entrenchment:Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings
dc.type期刊篇目
分類:Volume09,No.1

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