完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Cheng-Te Lee | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-25T07:52:40Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-25T07:52:40Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007/07/01 | |
dc.identifier.issn | issn18190917 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.fcu.edu.tw/handle/2376/2631 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the stability of arms races in the Third World countries and assumes that_x000D_ the utility function is separable between the consumption and the weapon stocks. We find that_x000D_ the military expenditures and the weapon stocks will exhibit stability and overshooting takes_x000D_ place for the optimal control models. Moreover, we prove that the differential game model_x000D_ has an unstable equilibrium, a result opposite of Deger and Sen (1984). | |
dc.description.sponsorship | 逢甲大學 | |
dc.format.extent | 16 | |
dc.language.iso | 英文 | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 經濟與管理論叢 | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 第3卷第2期 | |
dc.subject | arms race | |
dc.subject | differential game model | |
dc.title | A New Explanation of Arms Races in the Third World:A New Explanation of Arms Races in the Third World : A Differential Game Model | |
dc.type | 期刊篇目 | |
分類: | 第 03卷第2期 |
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