代理問題與應計項目品質之關聯

Abstract

Jensen and Meckling (1976)提出代理問題的概念，而代理問題又分為傳統代理問題及核心代理問題。經理人及控制股東可能因為自利動機而運用裁決性應計項目來操縱盈餘，造成公司價值下降，並侵害主理人及小股東的權益。應計項目品質是衡量盈餘品質的重要指標之一，本研究以盈餘品質中的應計項目品質來探討代理問題，期許對金融市場之既存已久的情形能有所釐清。 本研究實證結果發現，在傳統代理問題中，自由現金流量與應計項目品質無顯著關係，結果不如預期。當董事會規模越大，董監事持股比率及外部董事比率越高，應計項目品質也會越好。在核心代理問題中，控制權與現金流量權偏離和應計項目品質符合預期方向但並不顯著。

Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed the concept of agency problem. Agent problem could be divided into traditional agency problem and core agency problem. Because of self-interested motivation, the managers and controlling shareholders may use discretionary accruals for earnings management which would reduce firms’ value and harm the interests of minority shareholders. Quality of accruals is one of the most important indicators to measure the earning quality. This study uses quality of accruals, as a proxy for earnings quality, to explore the agency problems in corporate governance. In the situation of traditional agency problems, our empirical results show that no significant relationship exists between free cash flow and quality of accruals. And, the larger the size of the board, the higher the ratio of outside directors and directors’ shareholding, the quality of accruals will be better. In the situation of core agency problems, the relationship between separation of control rights and cash-flow rights and quality of accruals is consistent with our predictions but not significant.