財務困難之主併公司在併購宣告日前從事盈餘管理對股價之影響

Abstract

併購文獻中?有學者主張證券市場在購併宣告日前兩個月間，對於破產機率低的主併公司(Acquiring Firms)遠較破產機率高的主併公司，在以累積超額報酬(Cumulative Abnormal Return, CAR)為標準的評價上為高(Lin and Piesse,2003)。同時，Erickson and Wang（1999）也指出主併公司在從事購併行為前，有極大的誘因操縱盈餘，以拉抬股價、降低購併成本。由於主併公司的財務體質以及盈餘管理的程度，都是市場可以藉以判斷公司在後併購時期(post-merger)的表現依據。但是市場是否能發現其中的變化，並據此調整其投資組合，至今仍是一個未經探詢的領域。本文將主併公司依公司的破產機率和盈餘管理程度，區分成四個群組，以檢視購併事件宣告前後，市場對該公司的股價反應，並觀測市場對於公司從事盈餘管理的行為在股價上的反應，是否會因公司破產機率群組的不同，而有不對稱的反應，藉此檢驗市場的效率程度。實證結發現市場對財務困難的公司中，盈餘操縱幅度較高之群組所作之評價最差；但對非財務困難公司，盈餘操縱幅較高之群組所作之評價最高。而市場對於高破產風險低盈餘管理以及低破產風險低盈餘管理的公司似乎反應強度居中。因此，根據實證結果的建議，市場效率在短期內的確有條件上差異之現象。

Erickson and Wang (1999) claimed that acquirers are usually motivated to undertake earnings manipulation strategy to favor their stock prices for the reduction of their merger costs. Meanwhile, scholars such as Lin and Piesse (2003) suggested that the stock market tends to prefer the non-distressed acquirers to the distressed ones around their announcement dates in terms of the sizes of their cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). As acquirers' financial strength and accounting management are two of their post-merger performance indicators, little attention has been attracted to the combined power of the two factors over the acquirers' market values as well as jointly testing market efficiency hypothesis. This paper attempt to fill in this academic gap by classifying acquiring companies in US during 1997-2002 into four groups based on their financial statuses and degrees of earning manipulation right before their merger announcement dates, and examining the market reactions to them respectively. Empirical results surprisingly show that the market in general prefers non-distressed acquirers to distressed ones. In addition, acquirers with highest degrees of earnings manipulation secured highest CAR in non-distressed group in the short-term, opposite to those in distressed group. Evidence suggests a market preference phenomenon that is firstly illustrated in merger literature.